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Abstract 
Location information security in geocast routing in VAVETs has not been explored accountably. Some routes have been tried to 
explore in this direction using traditional authentication and key management technique which increases protocol complexity and
computational overhead. To address the issues of traditional security techniques, this paper proposes, Location Information 
Verification cum Security (LIVES) based on Transferable Belief Model (TBM).  In LIVES, two level location information 
verification is carried out. In level-1 tiles based verification technique is used to verify the correctness of location information. In 
level-2, collective belief about the announced position information of each vehicle is calculated using TBM with the help of 
neighbor list information from all neighboring vehicles. A secured geocast routing (SGR) protocol is developed using the two 
level location verification technique. Simulations are carried out using ns-2 and results have been analyzed in terms of location 
error probability. The comparative analysis of simulation results confirm the better suitability of LIVES ascompared to the state-
of-the-art technique: A-VIP in high dynamic vehicular adhoc network environment. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, number of projects in European Commission [1] confirms that VANETs has gained remarkable 
research.Liang et al. [2] describes that Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) applications are based on the 
framework of VANETs[2]. ITS constitute on various applications such as co-operative traffic monitoring, blind 
crossing, prevention of collisions, control of traffic flows nearby information services as discussed by Li et al. [3]. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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However, another important application of VANETs is supply of internet access to vehicular nodes during their 
movement. As this Internet connectivity access provides the users an opportunity of browsing and gaming as 
suggested by Benslimane et al. [4], and Tonguz and Boban [5].To realize these applications, information 
dissemination in vehicular traffic environment with reliability and efficiency has become one of the fundamental 
research issues as investigated by Gerla et al. [6]. Various techniques have been suggested in literature as reviewed 
by Suthaputchakun et al. [7]. One of the most preferred information dissemination technique in VANETs is geocast 
routing as investigated by Kaiwartya and Sushil [8, 9]. Geographic location discovery of vehicles is one of the 
important functional modules of geocast routing in vehicular traffic environment as explored by Fiore et al. [10]. 
During geocasting, geographic location of next hop vehicle is obtained by broadcasting location query control 
packets in the neighborhood which is continuously re-broadcastedas used by Kaiwartya et al. [11]. Location 
discovery process creates a security hole for malicious location attacker vehicle which tries to disrupt the 
functionality of geocast routing by introducing either false location claim or modified the other vehicles location 
claim. Various security enable techniques as reviewed by Mejri et al. [12] have been used in geocast routing to 
address the security concern but most of the techniques are based on cryptography which is inappropriate for highly 
dynamic vehicular traffic environment. 
To address the aforementioned concern, this paper proposes Location Information Verification cum Security 
(LIVES) based on Transferable Belief Model (TBM) in geocast routing. In LIVES, two level location information 
verification is carried out. In level-1,computation of Tiles based Verification (TV) probability for the location 
information announced by each neighboring vehicles is mathematically derived. In level-2, Collective belief 
computation is mathematically derived explaining the major components of TBM in the context of location 
information problem. A secured geocast routing (SGR) protocol is developed using the two level location 
verification technique. Simulations are carried out using ns-2 and results have been analyzed in terms of location 
error probability. Results of LIVES are compared with that of Verification and Inference of Position using 
Anonymous beaconing (A-VIP) suggested by Malandrino et al. [13] and Without considering LIVES (W-LIVES) 
approach. The rest of the paper is organized into following sections. In section 2, related literatures are critically 
reviewed considering the main security module limitation, strength and limitations. In section 3, complete formation 
of LIVES along with SGR is presented. In section 4, simulation and analysis of results are discussed. Section 5 
concludes the work presented in this research article.   
2. Related Work 
In geocast routing, Location discovery process creates a security hole for malicious location attacker vehicle which 
tries to disrupt the functionality of geocast routing by introducing either false or modified location claim. Although, 
the issues has not been explored accountably, yet few research works have explored location verification in vehicular 
communication. Verification and Inference of Position using Anonymous beaconing (A-VIP) has been suggested by 
Malandrino et al. [13]. It is a server based approach for location verification. The verification technique also infers 
the correct location of position faking vehicles and thus secures location information in vehicular communication. 
Although, the technique is claimed to be promising but the requirement of server for verification and inference is 
reducing the importance of the technique due to the growing importance of distributed approached in highly 
dynamic vehicular environment.  
A location verification technique has been suggested by Zhang et al. [14] using cooperative neighbor vehicle. 
The technique uses Radio Frequency (RF) based location verification approach in which two vehicles, namely a 
verifier and a cooperator verify claimed location of a vehicle. Verifier and cooperator vehicles send a challenge 
message to the vehicle which is claiming a location in the network. The vehicle claiming a location replies the 
challenge messages sent by verifier and cooperator. The two replies of the challenge are used to verify the claiming 
location of the vehicle based on Time-of-Flight (ToF) on these two replies. Although, the accuracy of ToF based 
location verification is good for static network but in highly dynamic vehicular traffic environment, the accuracy is 
not reliable. The impact of vehicle speed on the ToF based distance calculation has not been considered in the above 
approach.
An approach to overcome non-line of sight (NLOS) situation in location verification has been suggested by 
Abumansoor and Boukerche [15] using cooperative neighbor vehicles. Due to NLOS condition, when a vehicle 
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(verifier) is not able to verify the Location claim of another neighboring vehicle then the verifier vehicle uses other 
neighboring vehicles with no NLOS problem. In this verification approach, triangle based distance calculation is 
used with simple control packet communication.  Although, angle based distance calculation is quite successful in 
static network, but in highly dynamic vehicular adhoc networks, its performance could not be guaranteed in terms of 
accuracy. Various position verification techniques that could be used in vehicular traffic environment have been 
investigated by Leinmuller et al. [16] . Authors claimed that the suggested verification and inference techniques did 
not require special hardware or infrastructure support. Verification is mainly based on autonomous sensors, 
cooperative sensors and digital street map. 
3. LIVES
In this section, two levels location verification technique is presented. 
3.1 Level-1: Tiles based Verification 
Let ܶ is the set of tiles and ܸ is the set of neighboring vehicles of current forwarding vehicle (cf. Figure 1). The 
position information of each tile in terms of latitude and longitude ݐ௟௔ǡ௟௢  are calculated dynamically by current 
forwarding vehicle and stored in a setܲ௧. The position information of each border area tiles have been approximated 
using a specific error balancing constant݁௕௧ . Let the current forwarding vehicle is on tileܽ. For each pair of tiles 
ሺܽǡ ܾሻ א ܶ the quality of received signal strengthݍ௕௧  has been calculated using shadowing propagation model and 
stored in a setܳ௧ . The announced position information ݒ௟௔ǡ௟௢of each neighboring vehicle of current forwarding 
vehicle is stored in a setܲ௩. The received signal strength of each announced position information ݍ௜௩ for ݒ௜  has also 
been recorded and stored in a set ܳ௩ . 

Figure 1. Transmission range of a vehicle as a set of tiles
Figure 2. Flowchart of tiles based verification 
algorithm
Algorithm 1:Tiles based Verification (TV)
Input : ߜ
1. ܸଵ ൌ ׎
2.   forሺ׊ݒ௜ א ܸሻ
3.        if (ݒ௜ א  ݒ௝’s neighbor list) 
4.          determine ௩ܶ೔ using shadowing propagation model 
5.  calculate݌௩೔
்௏ using equation (1) 
6.              if (݌௩೔
்௏ ൐ ߜ)
7.                   ܸଵ ൌ ሼܸଵ ڂݒ௜ሽ
8.               endif
9.        endif 
10.   endfor 
Outputܸଵ
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The level-1 verification is executed for each ݒ௜ א ܸ that has announced its position information and at least one other 
neighboring vehicle ݒ௝ א ܸ of current forwarder has reported the presence of ݒ௜in its neighbor list.  The probability 
of tiles based verification ݌௩೔
்௏of a vehicle ݒ௜ can be calculated as expressed in Equation (1). 
݌௩೔
்௏ ൌ ଵ
ቚ ೡ்೔ቚ
 ǡ ݒ௜ א ܸ      (1) 
where ௩ܶ೔ is the set of all tiles where vehicle ݒ௜  can be approximated based on received signal strength. If the 
probability  ݌௩೔
்௏ is greater than a threshold valueߜ, ݒ௜is considered to pass the tiles based verification test. Set of 
steps of Tiles-based Verification (TV) is provided in algorithm-1. A flowchart is also give in Figure 2.  
3.2 Level-2: Verification using TBM 
In level-2, collective belief ௝ܾ
௖ is computed for each vehicle ݒ௝ א ܸ using Transferable Belief Model (TBM) 
discovered by Smets and Kennes [17]. The individual belief ܾ௩ೖǡ௝
௜ of vehicle ݒ௞ א ܸ െ ሼݒ௞ሽ about a vehicle ݒ௝and the 
individual belief ܾ௧ೖǡ௝
௜ of a tile ݐ௞ א  are combined to calculate ௝ܾ௖. The calculation of individual belief and use of 
TBM theory is described below. 
x Frame of Discernment 
A set ȳ containing each possible states of a system is called Frame of Discernment in TBM theory. In the position 
verification systems the set of position of tiles ܲ௧  is frame of discernment and can be represented as given by 
Equation (2).  
ȳ ൌ ܲ௧ ൌ ሼ ௟ܲ௔ǡ௟௢௧ ሺݐ௜ሻǡ ׊ݐ௜ א ܶሽ        (2) 
x Individual Belief calculation
The individual belief of each tile ܾ௧್ǡ௝
௜ is calculated as expressed by Equation (3).  
ܾ௧್ǡ௝
௜ ൌ
௤್
೟ି௤ೕ
ೡ
௤್
೟  ǡ Ͳ ൑ ܾ௧್ǡ௝
௜ ൑ ͳ        (3) 
Where,ݍ௕௧  represents quality of received signal of tile ݐ௕ and ݍ௝௩represents quality of received signal of vehicleݒ௝. The 
individual belief ܾ௩ೖǡ௝
௜ of each vehicle ݒ௞ א ܸis calculated by using various matrices such as number of outgoing 
packets routed though݊௢௨௧, number of other neighboring vehicles ݊௡having entry of ݒ௜as neighbor, difference of 
speed ݏௗ, number of incoming packets though݊௜௡, percentage quality ݍ௣ of received signal strength as compared to 
ideal received signal. The ܾ௩ೖǡ௝
௜  can be calculated expressed by Equation (4).  
ܾ௩ೖǡ௝
௜ ൌ ݓ௢௨௧ ൬
௡೚ೠ೟
೟೓ ି௡೚ೠ೟
௡೚ೠ೟
೟೓ ൰ Ǥ ݓ௡ ቀ
௡೙೟೓ି௡೙
௡೙೟೓
ቁ Ǥ ݓௗ ൬
௦೏
೟೓ି௦೏
௦೏
೟೓ ൰ Ǥ ݓ௜௡ ൬
௡೔೙
೟೓ି௡೔೙
௡೔೙
೟೓ ൰ Ǥ ݓ௣ ൬
௤೛೟೓ି௤೛
௤೛೟೓
൰  (4) 
Where,ݓ௢௨௧ǡ ݓ௡ǡ ݓௗǡ ݓ௜௡ǡ ݓ௣  are weights of corresponding parameters and used to adjust the impact of 
parameters.
x Transformation of Individual Beliefs into Collective Belief
The current forwarding vehicle collects all the individual beliefs of tiles as well as neighboring vehicles and 
performs pignistic transformation. The collective belief of a vehicle ݒ௝ א ܸ  can be calculated as given by Equation 
(5). 
௝ܾ
௖ ൌ ς ܾ௧್ǡ௝
௜ ൅ ܾ௩ೕǡ಴ಷ
௜ ൅ȁ்ȁ௕ୀଵ σ ൫ͳ െ ܾ௧್ǡ௝
௜ ൯ȁ்ȁ௕ୀଵ ς ൫ܾ௧್ǡ௝
௜ ൯
௫
൫ܾ௧್ǡ௝
௜ ൯
௬
ǥ ൫ܾ௧್ǡ௝
௜ ൯
௭ᇣᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇤᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇧᇥ
ଵǣȁ்ȁିଵ௧௘௥௠௦
ȁ்ȁ
௫ǡ௬ǡ௭ǡǤǤ௟ୀଵ
௫ஷ௬ஷǤǤǤஷ௭ஷ௜
   (5) 
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The collective belief ௝ܾ
௖  is used to evaluate a neighboring vehicle during geocasting of packets. The complete 
geocasting algorithm by using two-level verification has been provided in the next section. 
x Secure Geocast Routing (SGR) Algorithm
The above two level location verification technique has been utilized to realize secure geocast routing in algorithm 2. 
A flowchart of SGR algorithm is also provided in Figure 3. 
Algorithm 2: SGR 
Figure 3: Flowchart of secure geo cast routing algorithm 
Notations
ܥܨܸǣCurrent Forwarding Vehicle; ܸܵǣ Source Vehicle 
ܸܵܵ୘୚ǣ Set of Secure Vehicles by TV;ܶ: Set of tiles for ܥܨܸ
ܦܸǣ Destination Vehicle; ܰܪܸǣ Next Hop Vehicle 
்ܱܸܵ஻ெ: Set of One hop Neighbour Vehicles; 
Input
Process
1.initialization 
ܸܵܵ୘୚ ൌ ܰܪܸ ൌ ܱܸܵܰ ൌ ߶
2.for each (ݐ௕)
   calculate ܾ௧್ǡ௝
௜  using equation (3) 
   endfor
3. find ܸܵܵ୘୚ by executing  algorithm 
4. for each (ݒ௞ܸܵܵ୘୚)
         calculate ܾ௩ೖǡ௝
௜ using equation (4)
    endfor  
5. for each (ݒ௝ܸܵܵ୘୚)
         calculate ௝ܾ
௖using equation (5)
    endfor  
6. select the vehicle having maximum collective belief ܾ௖, let ݒ௝
7.ܰܪܸ ൌ ݒ௝
8. transmit the packet to ܰܪܸ and ܰܪܸ ൌ ܥܨܸ
9. exit 
Output:ܰܪܸሺݒ௝ሻ
4. Simulation and Analysis of Results 
In this section, simulation process and analysis of results are described. 
4.1 Simulation Environment 
The simulations are carried out in network simulator ns-2.34. To generate realistic vehicular network environment 
such as roads, junctions, traffic lights, etc., Mobility model generator for Vehicular networks (MOVE) is used. The 
essential scenario of vehicular traffic environment has been setup and implemented using the two main modules of 
MOVE; namely, road map editor and vehicle movement editor. A road network of four junction points with two 
lanes in each road is used. The distance between junctions is consideredͳͲͲͲ݉ in simulation area. Malicious 
vehicles are considered for generating false location information during geo-location discovery. The width of the 
considered lane on roads isͷ݉. The number of normal vehicles used is in the simulation is in the range 100-500 in 
all the lanes. The number of malicious vehicles is in the range 10-50 in all the lanes. Different vehicle speeds is 
considered for different vehicles during simulation. The speed of vehicles is in the range 5-60 Km/h for each 
simulation. Packet size of 512 bytes, transmission range of ʹͷͲ݉, wireless channel type, shadowing propagation 
model, traffic type as CBR, Omni directional antenna model, 802.11p MAC protocol and 600 s total simulation time  
are other basic parameters setup used in the simulation of LIVES. Different source vehicle and geocast region is 
randomly selected from two pre-determined junctions which is kept same for all the ten simulation runs for a 
recoding simulation points used in results.  
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4.2 Analysis of Simulation Results 
In this section results obtained for LIVES are analyzed.  
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Figure 4. Location error percentage versus number of 
adversary vehicles for single adversary vehicle in each 
vehicle’s transmission range 
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Figure 5. Location error percentage versus number of 
adversary vehicles for multiple adversary vehicle in each 
vehicle’s transmission range
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Figure 6. Comparison of end-to-end delay with mixed adversary vehicles (ten) in transmission range of vehicles 
Results obtained through the simulations carried out considering single adversary vehicle in each vehicle’s 
transmission range are depicted in Fig. 4.It can be clearly observed that location error probability of all the 
considered techniques increases with the increase in total number of adversary vehicles.  With ͷͲ total number of 
adversary vehicles, location error probabilities are approximately ʹͲΨǡ ͵ͷΨ and  ͹ͷΨ for LIVES, A-VIP and W-
LIVES respectively. The increment in location error probability is lower in case of LIVES as compared to A-VIP 
and W-LIVES. This is due to the fact that LIVES use distributed tiles based location verification effectively 
identifies false location announcement by single adversary vehicle in transmission range. Results obtained through 
the simulations carried out consideringmultiple adversary vehicles in each vehicle’s transmission range are depicted 
in Fig. 5. It clearly reveal that location error probabilityof all the considered techniques increases with the increase 
in total number of adversary vehicles.  With ͷͲ total number of adversary vehicles, location error probabilities are 
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approximately ʹͷΨǡ ͶͲΨ and  ͻͷΨ for LIVES, A-VIP and W-LIVES respectively.The increment in location error 
probability is lower in case of LIVES as compared to A-VIP and W-LIVES. This can be attributed to the fact that 
LIVES uses level 2 collective belief based adversary identification which efficiently find out group of adversaries in 
transmission range. Results obtained through the simulations carried out consideringmixed adversary vehicles in the 
transmission range of differentvehicles are depicted in Fig. 6. In some transmission range single adversary is 
considered and in some transmission range multiple adversaries are considered. It can be clearly observed that end-
to-end delay decreases faster in case of LIVES as compared to that of A-VIP and W-LIVES with the increase in 
total number of normal vehicles in the network area. The end-to-end delay decreases from Ͷ͹ to ʹͷin case of LIVES 
whereas it decreases from Ͷͻ to ͵ͷin case of A-VIP. 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
In this dissertation, a two level location verification technique named as LIVES has been proposed. The first level 
location verification is based on concept of tiles. The second level location verification is based on collective belief 
that is calculated using TBM theory. Tiles based verification has been proved single adversary vehicle detector in 
transmission range through simulation results. TBM based verification effectively identifies multiple adversary 
vehicles in transmission range.  As soon as the adversary vehicles are identified end-to-end delay in geocasting 
reduces quickly.  In future research, we will investigate effective optimization technique to select best possible next 
hop vehicle from all the non-adversary vehicles.  
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